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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











DISH NETWORK SERVICE, LLC 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-01550) 
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2012 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., NYGAARD and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 12, 2012 ) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Peter A. Abels (“Abels”) filed suit against DISH Network Service, LLC (“DISH”) 
alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.  The District Court granted DISH’s 
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motion for summary judgment, and Abels now appeals from that decision.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I.  
 Abels was hired by DISH in June of 2000, when he was forty-two years old, to 
work as a Field Service Specialist in DISH’s East Pittsburgh location.  In 2002, at the 
urging of Warehouse Manager Brian Manns (“Manns”), Abels transferred to work in the 
warehouse as an Inventory Specialist.  Manns was Abels’ immediate supervisor, and 
Manns was in turn supervised by the General Manager Paul Pevornik (“Pevornik”).  In 
2002, at the age of forty-four, Abels was promoted from Inventory Specialist to Senior 
Inventory Specialist.  In 2003, when Abels was forty-five, DISH implemented a 
Reduction in Force (“RIF”), which affected Inventory Specialists.  During the RIF, Dish 
retained its two oldest inventory specialists, including Abels, and terminated the 
youngest.  From 2003, when he was age forty-five, until 2008, when he was age fifty-
one, Abels received positive employment evaluations and annual raises.   
 While employed by DISH, Abels frequently complained about coworkers smoking 
too close to the warehouse door.  Though smoking does not make Abels physically ill, it 
upset him that coworkers were violating the company’s smoke free policy.  In response to 
Abels’ numerous complaints, DISH created a designated smoking area, sent emails 
reminding employees to use the designated smoking area, issued the same reminders 
during meetings, and reminded employees caught smoking outside of the designated area 
to only smoke within the designated area.  DISH also placed a “NO SMOKING” sign 
outside the warehouse door, purchased a receptacle for cigarette butts, and placed it away 
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from the warehouse door.  This was principally done to accommodate Abels, though he 
asserts these actions accomplished nothing, and he continued to complain about the 
smoking issue.   
 In 2006, Abels got in an argument with a Quality Assurance Specialist who 
walked into the warehouse with a cigarette.  During the argument, Abels yelled at the 
Specialist, called him names, and used profanity.1
 Lynne Shawley, the Human Resources Representative for several DISH locations, 
including East Pittsburgh, had received numerous complaints from other employees 
regarding Abels’ poor attitude and his hostile, belligerent, and gruff demeanor.  Though 
Abels argues that Shawley failed to document these complaints, he admits that sometime 
in the month preceding his termination, Shawley met with him to discuss the complaints.  
Additionally, as a result of personal interactions with Abels, Shawley found that Abels 
exhibited a disgruntled and hostile attitude and that he had difficulty moving beyond past 
perceived wrongs.   
   
 On February 26, 2009, Abels left the premises in the middle of his shift without 
permission.  Abels claims he went to Pevornik’s office to complain that his computer 
access had been limited, and that Installations Manager Frank Grubbs (“Grubbs”) was 
with Pevornik and witnessed the meeting.  Abels asserts Pevornik “lied to [his] face” 
about the computer issue, and that Abels then began to feel sick to his stomach.  Abels 
alleges that at this point he announced he was sick and that he was going home for the 
                                              
1 Abels was written up for his conduct, but refused to sign the Written Warning because 
he found it unjust that he was written up while someone who had violated the smoke free 
policy did not receive a warning. 
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day.  He claims that on his way out of the warehouse, he ran into his immediate 
supervisor Manns, informed Manns he was sick and going home early, and that Manns 
responded, “okay, see you tomorrow.”  Abels also claims he told David Stone (“Stone”), 
a coworker, he was going home sick.  Abels concedes he never sought permission to 
leave early from Pevornik or Manns, and he never received permission from Pevornik.2
Grubbs does not remember this meeting, and while Pevornik remembers the 
meeting, he asserts that Abels only complained about employees smoking.  Pevornik 
claims he left his office to investigate Abels’ smoking allegations, and when he returned, 
Abels had gone.   
 
 Manns stated he crossed paths with Abels as he was entering the building and 
Abels was leaving.  He described their brief conversation as follows:    
I’m like “Hey, what’s going on?”  [Abels] says, “I’m outta 
here.”  I said, “Well, what’s up?”  He goes, “I’m sick from 
smoking. I’m going home.”  He goes, “They’re out back.  
They’re smoking again.”  I said, “Well, come on in and sit 
down and let’s talk about it.”  He said, “I already talked to 
[Pevornik].”   
 
Manns did not discuss the matter further because Pevornik was Mann’s supervisor, and 
he did not believe it necessary to delve into a matter already settled by his supervisor.   
Shawley testified that Pevornik informed her Abels had left without permission 
because he was angry about the smoking situation.  Shawley spoke with Manns about the 
                                              
2 Abels does not argue that Manns gave him permission to leave early when he allegedly 
said “okay see you tomorrow.”  It is apparent that Manns did not give permission for two 
reasons.  First, Abels did not ask for permission from Manns to leave early, so the alleged 
“see you tomorrow” was not in response to a request.  Second, Manns testified he wanted 
to talk further with Abels about the issue before he left, but Abels declined, saying he had 
already met with Pevornik.   
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incident after Pevornik notified her, and Manns told her Abels had said, “I’m outta here” 
before he departed, and that Abels had not mentioned anything about being sick.   
 Stone remembered that Abels told him he was leaving work early, but could not 
recall if Abels had told him he was leaving because he was sick.   
 Shawley recommended that DISH treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation.  
In reaching this decision, she relied on her prior conversations with Abels, the frequent 
complaints she had received about Abels, the information provided her by Pevornik and 
Manns regarding Abels’ angry departure in the middle of his shift, and her experience in 
human resources.  Manns was assigned the task of informing Abels that DISH was 
treating his conduct as a voluntary resignation; Shawley told Manns what to tell Abels, 
and Pevornik instructed Manns to follow Shawley’s script.  Manns did so.   
 Abels filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), which issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter on August 23, 2010.  
On November 22, 2010, Abels filed a complaint in the federal District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that DISH had discriminated against him on 
the basis of age, in violation of the ADEA.  On September 30, 2011, DISH moved for 
summary judgment.  On December 15, 2011, a Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 
Recommendation, recommending that DISH’s motion be granted.  On January 30, 2012, 
the District Court issued an order granting DISH’s motion for summary judgment and 
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge as the opinion of the 




The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We apply plenary review to an appeal from a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment.  Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy 
Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment shall be granted if 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  “In making this determination, we must 
consider the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  
Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 264 F.3d at 369 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  A fact is material if it “could affect the outcome of the 
proceeding, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to 
permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Roth v. Nofalco 
LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).    
 The District Court analyzed the motion for summary judgment under the analysis 
set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the burdens of persuasion and 
production to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
A.  Legal Framework for ADEA Claims 
3
                                              
3 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA if he 
provides proof that: 1) the plaintiff was forty years of age or older; 2) that the plaintiff 
suffered an adverse employment action; 3) that the plaintiff was qualified for the job; and 
4) that the plaintiff was replaced by someone who was sufficiently younger than plaintiff 
to support an inference of discriminatory animus.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 
684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).   
  Smith v. City of 
Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).  After the plaintiff satisfies this 
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requirement, the burden of production, but not persuasion, shifts to the defendant to 
provide evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
action.  Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997).  If the 
defendant provides this evidence, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the defendant’s justification was a pretext for discriminatory animus.  City of 
Allentown, 589 F.3d at 691.  The plaintiff always has the burden of persuasion.  Id.   
The plaintiff may demonstrate that the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason is pretextual by submitting evidence that allows a fact finder to either 1) disbelieve 
or discredit the employer’s justification; or 2) believe discrimination was more likely than 
not a “but for” cause of the adverse employment action.  Fuentes v. Perksie, 32 F.3d 759, 
764 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108 (applying Fuentes in ADEA 
context).  Regardless of the method, the plaintiff’s evidence must allow a reasonable jury 
to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age discrimination was a “but for” cause 
for the adverse employment action.  Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 
177-78 (2009); City of Allentown, 589 F.3d at 691.   
Abels argues on appeal that the District Court erred in finding that Abels did not 
discredit DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to treat Abels’ 
conduct as a voluntary resignation.   
 Abels attempted to meet his burden at step three of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework by discrediting DISH’s explanation for its adverse employment action, under 
the first prong of Fuentes, and he claims the District Court erred in holding he did not 




 To discredit an employer’s proffered justification under the first prong of Fuentes  
  As support, Abels notes he testified that he had informed his 
superiors that he was sick and had to leave, and that none of DISH’s witnesses 
contradicted him.  Abels claims the District Court erred in finding this did not sufficiently 
discredit DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging him. 
the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons 
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find 
them unworthy of credence, . . . , and hence infer that the 
employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory 
reasons. 
 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In this matter, DISH considered the following in deciding to treat Abels’ 
conduct as a voluntary resignation: his angry departure in the middle of his shift without 
permission, his hostile and belligerent demeanor, and the numerous complaints from his 
coworkers about him.  Abels must provide evidence that will “allow a factfinder to 
reasonably infer that each of [DISH’s] proffered non-discriminatory reasons  . . . was 
either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment 
action . . . .”  Id. at 764 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). While Abels 
need not discredit each reason articulated, he must “cast substantial doubt on a fair 
number of them” so that “the factfinder’s rejection of some of the defendant’s proffered 
reasons may impede the employer’s credibility seriously enough so that a factfinder may 
                                              
4 The parties concede, for purposes of this motion, that Abels made out his prima facie 
case.  In addition, Abels does not argue DISH did not satisfy its burden to produce 
evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 
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rationally disbelieve the remaining proffered reasons. . . .”  Id. at 764 n.7.  Abels claims 
that none of DISH’s witnesses contradicted his assertion that he informed several 
supervisors and a coworker that he was going home sick.  Even if this were true, it is 
irrelevant for three reasons.   
 
1. It is immaterial whether Abels told any supervisors he was sick 
 Whether Abels told his supervisors that he was sick is not a material fact because 
it does not “affect the outcome of the proceeding.”  Roth, 651 F.3d at 373.  Abels’ health 
was not the basis for DISH’s action; DISH treated Abels as having voluntarily resigned 
because, in part, he left work early without permission.   Therefore, the lack of 
permission to leave work early is the material fact, about which Abels must demonstrate 
a “genuine dispute.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  There is no such dispute regarding this fact.  
Abels admits he did not request permission to leave early from either Pevornik or Manns; 
he informed them he was leaving, and did not await a response.  Abels also concedes that 
Pevornik did not give him permission to leave early.  The fact that Abels told his 
supervisors that he was sick, if true, does not create a genuine issue as to whether he left 
mid-shift without permission.5   
 
2.  Abels has not shown DISH’s decision was motivated by age-based discrimination 
Abels must show that age-based discrimination was a “but-for” cause of this 
decision; he “cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, 
                                              
5 Abels attempts to cast doubt regarding the issue of permission by arguing that Shawley 
and Pevornik said employees who were ill could leave without permission.  A reading of 
the deposition transcripts to which Abels cites, however, reveals that is not what either of 
them said.  Pevornik testified that managerial approval was needed before an employee 
could leave mid-shift.   
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since the factual dispute at issue is whether the discriminatory animus motivated the 
employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.”  Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 765; see also Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-78 (plaintiff must show age-based 
discriminatory animus is a “but-for” cause of adverse employment action).  “‘The 
question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it 
is whether the real reason is [discrimination].’”  Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Carson 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)).   
The evidence shows that Abels was terminated after Shawley made the 
recommendation to treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation and Pevornik accepted 
that recommendation.  Pevornik informed Shawley that Abels was angry and disgruntled 
and had left in the middle of his shift.  Shawley then spoke with Manns about the 
incident, who told her that Abels had only said “I’m outta here” before he left.  As a 
result, both Shawley and Pevornik believed that Abels had left work angrily that day, 
without permission, due to the smoking situation, not illness.  For purposes of the ADEA, 
it is irrelevant if they were mistaken in that belief.  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765; see also 
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We do not sit 
as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. . . . no 
matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere.”) (citation 
omitted).  Even if Shawley and Pevornik had misinterpreted the reasons for Abels’ 
leaving, that does not provide evidence that the true motivation behind their decision was 
age-based discrimination.  Nor does it change the fact that they correctly determined 
Abels had left without permission, which was one of the bases for their decision. 
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 Aside from Abels’ unsanctioned departure from the premises, DISH cites two 
other factors it considered in deciding to treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation: 
his hostile demeanor at work, and the numerous complaints Shawley had received from 
other employees about him.  Abels did not provide sufficient evidence to discredit these 
considerations.  He attempted to challenge Shawley’s allegation of coworker complaints 
by noting that Shawley did not record any of these complaints.  However, Abels concedes 
Shawley called a meeting with him sometime prior to February 26, 2009 to discuss these 
complaints, which indicates they are not a “post hoc fabrication . . . that is, . . . a pretext.”  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  Similarly, Abels has not offered any evidence to discredit 
Shawley’s determinations, based on her own interactions with Abels, that he had a hostile 
and belligerent attitude in the workplace.  Though Abels need not “cast doubt on each 
proffered reason in a vacuum,” he has not “manage[d] to cast substantial doubt on a fair 
number of them,” such that “a factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining 
proffered reasons.”  Id. at 764, n.7.   
3.  Abels does not discredit the other factors that went into DISH’s decision 
Abels has established, at most, a dispute as to a non-material fact: whether he told 
his supervisors he was sick.  The only material fact regarding his leaving work early is 
whether he received permission to do so, and it is undisputed he did not.  Abels failed to 
provide any evidence that DISH’s interpretation of his conduct was based on age 
discrimination, and he similarly failed to rebut or discredit the other factors that went into 
DISH’s decision to terminate him.  Looking at the record in the light most favorable to 
Abels, he did not satisfy his burden to establish that DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory 
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reasons for discharge were pretextual and that age was a “but for” cause of the adverse 
employment action.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
DISH’s motion for summary judgment.   
 
